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Abstract
This article explores the proposition that the brain, normally seen as an organ of the human body, should be understood as a 
biologically based form of artificial intelligence, in the course of which the case is made for a new kind of ‘brain exception-
alism’. After noting that such a view was generally assumed by the founders of AI in the 1950s, the argument proceeds by 
drawing on the distinction between science—in this case neuroscience—adopting a ‘telescopic’ or a ‘microscopic’ orientation 
to reality, depending on how it regards its characteristic investigative technologies. The paper concludes by recommending 
a ‘microscopic’ yet non-reductionist research agenda for neuroscience, in which the brain is seen as an underutilised organ 
whose energy efficiency is likely to outstrip that of the most powerful supercomputers for the foreseeable future.
Keywords Brain exceptionalism · Cognitive agriculture · Microscope · Neural nets · Neuroscience · Reductionism · 
Supercomputer · Telescope
In what follows, I explore the proposition that the brain, nor-
mally seen as an organ of the human body, should be under-
stood as a biologically based form of artificial intelligence 
(AI). As I observe in the “Introduction”, this proposition 
was assumed by the founders of AI in the 1950s, though it 
has been generally side-lined over the course of AI’s history. 
However, advances in both neuroscience and more conven-
tional AI make it interesting to consider the issue anew. The 
main body of the paper approaches the matter from a dis-
tinction that the philosopher Bas van Fraassen has drawn in 
terms of science adopting a ‘telescopic’ or a ‘microscopic’ 
orientation to reality. The history of neuroscience has exhib-
ited both tendencies from its inception, not least in terms of 
the alternative functions performed by the field’s character-
istic technologies. Appreciating the full implications of this 
distinction requires escaping from the ‘reductionist’ prob-
lematic that continues to haunt philosophical discussions of 
neuroscience’s aspirations as a mode of inquiry. As becomes 
clear by the Conclusion, my own preference is for an ambi-
tious ‘microscopic’ agenda for neuroscience, which in the 
long term may see organically grown neural networks—if 
not full-fledged brains—carrying out many if not most of 
the functions that nowadays are taken to be the purview of 
silicon-based computers. In this respect, I am arguing for 
a new kind of ‘brain exceptionalism’, one based not on the 
brain’s natural mysteries but on its relative energy efficiency 
vis-à-vis competing (silicon) technologies.
1  Introduction: the brain as a work 
in progress
The history of artificial intelligence (AI) is normally told in 
terms of three research strategies that coalesced in the wake 
of the Macy Conferences, which were first held at Dartmouth 
College in 1956: one focused on neural networks, one on 
cybernetic systems and one simply on computational power 
(Gardner 1985: Chap. 6). The third, which carried the least 
ontological baggage, became the dominant understanding of 
AI. A striking feature of all three strategies—which perhaps 
helps to explain the dominance of the third—is the failure 
to clearly distinguish modelling and making the target phe-
nomenon, ‘intelligence’ (Dupuy 2000: Chap. 2). This may 
have been to do with the preponderance of mathematicians 
among the AI founders, who privileged the search for ana-
lytic clarity over the need to provide concrete instantiation, 
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sometimes to the exasperation of interloping physicists 
(Malapi-Nelson 2017: Chaps. 7–8).
To be sure, this persistent ambiguity has contributed to 
the Turing Test’s iconic status as popular culture’s portal 
into the world of AI. After all, the test’s fascination rests on 
the difficulty that humans normally have in distinguishing a 
‘natural’ from an ‘artificial’ intelligence (i.e. a fellow human 
from an android) simply based on the candidate being’s per-
formance in response to their questions. It led one of the AI 
pioneers, psychiatrist Ross Ashby, to quip that passing the 
Turing test simply meant that questioner and respondent had 
established a common standard of something they agree to 
call ‘intelligence’ without saying what it is. For Ashby, the 
‘brain’ was whatever could reliably enable an entity to pass 
such a test, regardless of its material composition (Malapi-
Nelson 2017: Chap. 6). This orientation to intelligence is 
rather like the economist’s view that a good’s value is simply 
the price that it fetches in a free market or, perhaps more to 
the point, the Popperian view that what both scientists and 
lay people mean by ‘true’ is simply whatever passes critical 
scrutiny. In each of these cases, the normative standard—
intelligence, value and truth—functions as a reversible con-
vention rather than as a fixed essence.
However, the blurring of the natural/artificial distinction 
cannot simply be reduced to the abstractness—or ontologi-
cal neutrality—of the AI research agenda itself. After all, 
the one arguably ‘natural’ focus of AI research, the brain, 
has itself always been regarded within this tradition a work 
in progress, an artefact in the making. Indeed, Ashby pub-
lished a book in 1952 with the bold title, Design for a Brain. 
Moreover, the original AI researchers specifically focused 
on the brain—Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts—did not 
try to model the entire organ in terms of its multiple known 
functionalities, which one might think would have been the 
most logical way to go and is probably the dominant sense 
in which AI researchers today think about the prospect of 
computers possessing ‘brains’. Instead they constructed an 
idealised version of the biological brain’s functional equiva-
lent to an atom, the neuron. Vast combinations of these neu-
rons were portrayed as engaged in the parallel processing of 
data from a variety of sensory sources, resulting in emergent 
patterns of co-activity which over time become so integrated 
that they then—and only then—constitute a ‘brain’.
In effect, McCulloch and Pitts had proposed to grow a 
brain in a silicon setting. The project was initially met with 
considerable scepticism by early AI’s most constructive 
critic, John von Neumann, but was later revived with much 
enhanced computer power in the 1980s under the rubrics 
of ‘connectionism’ and ‘parallel distributed processing’. 
It continues to enjoy support today, though still far from 
meeting its initial promise (Malapi-Nelson 2017: Chap. 7; 
Boden 2006: Chap. 12). What remains striking about this 
approach—and animates the spirit of my argument—is its 
assumption that the way in which biological brains instanti-
ate intelligence captures something deep about intelligence 
itself, which remains untapped if we only focus on the 
brain’s known functionalities, as these may simply reflect the 
specific pathways through which brains have so far evolved.
In other words, what McCulloch and Pitts had captured 
was the idea that the organic is organized—not only that 
brains perform as they do because of the environments in 
which they have been so far placed, but also that in differ-
ent environments brains would behave in (potentially better) 
ways precisely because of their material composition. The 
latter point, which also informs the thinking behind contem-
porary ‘synthetic biology’, envisages the genes and cells that 
compose ‘natural’ living beings as literal building blocks—
self-contained energy modules, if you will—that could be 
‘organized’ to produce new (and improved) bio-based edi-
fices by drawing on the expertise of both biologists and engi-
neers (Church and Regis 2012; cf.; Fuller 2016a). The most 
obvious precedent for this line of thought is capitalism’s 
default understanding of labour as an underutilised produc-
tive force or unexploited potential that may be improved by 
‘better organisation’. Indeed, one of the British AI pioneers, 
Stafford Beer, picked up on this point to become one of the 
early exemplars of the ‘management guru’ (Pickering 2010: 
Chap. 6). The final section of this paper revisits this sensibil-
ity via ‘cognitive agriculture’.
To be sure, more than a half-century after AI’s original 
encounters with the brain, biochemistry continues to offer 
much the same appraisal of the organ’s self-creative capac-
ity, even in its natural carbon-centred terms: human genes 
produce 100 billion neurons that are only locally organised 
at an individual’s birth but become more globally integrated 
through repeated experience and feedback over the individ-
ual’s lifetime (Williams and Frausto da Silva 2007: 483). 
Observations of this sort have helped to fuel the recent inter-
est in ‘epigenetics’, with its promise of training up an always 
only partially formed brain via a cocktail of chemicals and 
external stimuli, even to the point of allowing for an ‘adult 
neurogenesis’ (Rubin 2009).
But more directly relevant for our purposes, this general 
‘neuroplastic’ understanding of the brain casts doubt on the 
popular but crude distinction that the brain is ‘hardware’ to 
the mind’s ‘software’. The metaphor jars because it suggests 
too strong an association between computer hardware and 
the ‘blank slate’ conception of the mind traditionally attrib-
uted to Aristotle and Locke. In recent times, this view has 
been vilified by the evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker 
(2002) for leaving the impression that the brain’s powers are 
reducible to the sum of the algorithms that are programmed 
into it once it comes into the world. To be sure, the ease 
with which we speak of ‘erasing’ data from a computer 
drive points to such a slate-like conceptualisation of hard-
ware. Thus, those who like Ray Kurzweil nowadays fixate 
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on Moore’s law—which points to an exponential growth in 
silicon-based computational power—may be unwittingly 
exemplifying Pinker’s point. Here computer hardware is 
literally little more than a platform for software, the latter 
taken to be ultimately driving the AI project, which will get 
easier over time as Moore’s law plays itself out and the plat-
form becomes increasingly capable of doing more with less.
Pinker’s own argument—perhaps a bit too influenced by 
genetics—emphasises the brain’s capacity to resist certain 
attempts at the sort of customisation that he associates with 
utopian political sensibilities, starting with Rousseau and 
including Marx and even B.F. Skinner, whose own algorith-
mically ordered utopia was governed by ‘schedules of rein-
forcement’ (Fuller 2006: 172–173, 196–201). However, the 
argument can be flipped to imply that the brain’s capacity, 
while not inherently ‘blank’, has yet to be tapped in the right 
ways. In other words, utopians of yore may have failed sim-
ply because they did not (know how to) intervene in brain 
processes in ways that would enable their policies to stick 
in their recipients’ minds as bases for action. But it does not 
follow that human brains are incapable of realising some-
thing similar in scale and scope to the utopians’ blueprints. 
In that case, a more appropriate contrast for understanding 
the brain-mind relationship may be the wetware/dryware dis-
tinction, which is drawn by nanotechnologists to distinguish 
the organic base (‘wetware’) from the prosthetic attachments 
(‘dryware’), which when taken together turn an organism 
into a cyborg.
The advantage of this distinction is that it does not pre-
suppose a clean ontological split between brain and mind. 
Indeed, the original proposal for a ‘philosophy of technol-
ogy’ in the late nineteenth century by Ernst Kapp assumed 
that over the course of human evolution, the powers of our 
brains are being enhanced by the multiplication and ampli-
fication of our senses, which may eventually involve their 
wetware components being replaced by dryware exten-
sions (Brey 2000). The neuroscientist David Eagleman has 
updated and concretised this idea by suggesting that in the 
not too distant future clothing may be designed to interface 
directly with the brain, thereby providing portals for their 
wearers to process additional sensory data on a regular basis 
(Mason 2015). This prospect should be kept in mind as we 
consider what alternative approaches to neuroscience say 
about the sort of entity that we take the brain to be.
2  Two technological approaches 
to the brain: the telescope 
and the microscope
Thomas Kuhn (1962) famously likened a scientific revolu-
tion to a Gestalt switch. What he meant was that often it 
takes only a slight shift in perspective to cause a radical 
shift in understanding. In principle, no new facts are needed, 
just a new sense of the logic of their arrangement. At the 
moment, the research aspirations of neuroscience—at least 
as popularly represented—often seem captive to a philo-
sophical impasse, the problematic of reductionism, which 
requires a Gestalt switch.
There is a real disagreement between those who envis-
age neuroscience as potentially expanding our conception 
of reality and those who see it as an auxiliary science, 
ultimately telling us little that we did not already know, 
except when brains do not enable their bearers to do what is 
expected of them. On the one hand, those who argue for an 
epistemically strong neuroscience agenda often suggest that 
we are simply our brains; on the other, those who resist neu-
roscience’s delusions of grandeur counter that we simply use 
our brains to be who we are, which in some important sense 
always escapes the confines of the brain. Philosophers tend 
to stereotype this disagreement as ‘materialism versus dual-
ism’, the former functioning as the unofficial ideology of sci-
ence and the latter of religion. Put more precisely, the ‘mate-
rialists’ on this view uphold a universal scientism, whereas 
the ‘dualists’ believe that science must ultimately yield to 
a more spiritual way of seeing the world. Thus, the former 
are dubbed ‘reductionists’ and the latter ‘anti-reductionists’.
But as with so many other philosophical dichotomies, 
the scholastic familiarity of this one should breed contempt. 
My antidote is to turn the materialist-dualist polarity 90° on 
its axis, which would replace the reductionism problematic 
with a more explicitly sociological one about the sort of 
world that we would wish to inhabit, a problematic in which 
the brain continues to play a central role. In what follows, I 
characterise the two new poles in terms of the axial rotation 
that they require.
When ‘materialists’ sound like they are claiming that 
we are no more than our brains, they should be heard as 
meaning that we are no less. In other words, materialism in 
neuroscience would be better understood not as reducing 
the complex person to the activity of single organ, but as 
highlighting that organ’s distinctive capacity to enable its 
bearer to think and do a much wider range of things than s/
he normally does. This was the spirit in which Hilary Put-
nam (1982) originally proposed the ‘brains in a vat’ scenario 
as a stronger version of the Cartesian problem of scepti-
cism. Whereas Descartes imagined an evil demon capable 
of fabricating the world we actually experience, Putnam’s 
brains (sans demon) could do much more than that, precisely 
because they were hooked up to a machine that enabled the 
brains to perceive whatever they thought as reality. The 
intriguing suggestion here is that what we normally regard 
as the ‘external’ character of reality—be it caused by nature, 
society or some demon—may simply reflect limits placed 
on the full exploitation of the brain’s powers. This way of 
looking at things would stress the extent to which the brain 
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is held back by surroundings that fail to stimulate it in some 
relevant ways. In this context, proposals concerning ‘smart 
environments’ and ‘social enhancement’, be they made by 
B.F. Skinner, Donald Norman or contemporary transhuman-
ists can be seen as complementing the earlier discussion of 
David Eagleman’s work on wearable sensory technologies 
(cf. Cabrera 2015).
Similarly, those ‘dualists’ who stress that we are not 
reducible to our brains are not really positing a spiritual ‘I’ 
that oversees the brain’s activities and literally uses the organ 
for its own ends. Rather they should be interpreted as mean-
ing that even before we do any neuroscience, we already 
know what our brains are supposed to do—albeit by indirect 
means, such as observed behaviour or introspective states. 
This evidence is provided by the brain’s constant interaction 
with the rest of the body in which it is located, and that body 
with the larger environment, which includes other beings 
with brains. In that respect, the brain might be regarded as 
a synecdoche for the mind—that is, part of an ensemble of 
entities, which are orchestrated to bring about thinking and 
thoughtful action.
Clark (2008) and Bennett and Hacker (2013) offer com-
plementary glosses on this position, the former presented 
as a positive research programme in cognitive science and 
the latter as a systematic critique of contemporary cognitive 
neuroscience. In both cases, the phrase ‘extended mind’ is 
not inappropriate, since the idea is to shift the parameters of 
the mind from the brain itself to the other entities with which 
a brain co-produces a meaningful reality. In that case, neu-
roscience should be about explaining the specific structures 
and processes in the brain and nervous system that contrib-
ute to those publicly recognisable states of being ‘mindful’. 
Such an approach would stress the extent to which a brain 
enables its bearer to function in its normal environment. 
How that actually happens with regard to the neurophysiol-
ogy of an individual brain is bound to vary, perhaps even 
significantly, depending on personal history. When the brain-
bearer is behaving normally, those differences probably do 
not matter, but abnormal public behaviour may require inten-
sive brain-based investigation.
How does this refocusing of materialism and dualism 
constitute a ‘90°’ turn? The underlying idea is that each 
side of divide retains a key aspect of its position but also 
adopts a key aspect of the other position. Thus, the mate-
rialist is still fixed on the brain as the locus of the mind, 
and the dualist on the mind as something that escapes the 
brain. That’s the part of the old positions that remains intact. 
However, whereas older materialists would have dismissed 
out of hand the existence of a paranormal realm for its lack 
of conformity to normal brain function, my revisionist view 
of materialism is open to locating the paranormal realm in 
areas of the brain that remain ‘unexplored’, in the sense 
of not having received the relevant sensory contact. This 
involves a significant concession to classical dualism, but it 
is perhaps not so different from what passed for monism as 
a scientific philosophy in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, which included such hybrid metaphysical 
positions as ‘panpsychism’ (Fechner), ‘hylozoism’ (Haeckel) 
and ‘energeticism’ (Ostwald), all of which were open—to 
varying degrees—to probing the frontiers of consciousness 
(Weir 2012). Similarly, whereas older dualists would have 
dismissed out of hand any spatiotemporal specification of 
the mental and perhaps even spiritual properties that are by 
definition unconfined by brain processes, this revisionist 
dualism approximates a Neo-Heideggerian or Neo-Wittgen-
steinian view of the mind—familiar, say, from the sociology 
of the scientific knowledge—as a distributed entity that is 
defined by people and things located in specifiable regions 
of space–time which stand in certain mutually recognisable 
relations to each other, only some of which are explicitly 
codified but the violation of which can be verified by any of 
the relevant parties to those relations.
I said earlier that as a result of this 90° turn, the reduc-
tionist problematic in neuroscience morphs into a more gen-
eral question of the sort of world in which we would wish to 
live. The ‘new look’ materialist adopts what I have called, 
in another context, a proactionary attitude towards the brain, 
whereas the ‘new look’ dualist adopts a precautionary atti-
tude towards the world (Fuller and Lipinska 2014). The for-
mer tends to see the brain as normally underutilised and 
hence always in need of ‘enhancement’ or ‘improvement’ 
to realise its full potential, while the latter sees the brain 
as normally utilised just as it should but there remains an 
open question as to which other entities in the brain’s envi-
ronment help to sustain this normal functionality. A good 
way to capture the difference in bio-evolutionary terms is 
to see the proactionaries as stressing the fact that in the 
roughly 40,000 years since the human brain acquired its cur-
rent organic form, humanity’s orientation to the world has 
changed radically, ever more rapidly as we get closer to the 
present. This phenomenon is not unreasonably seen from a 
historical standpoint as the product of a direct and indirect 
re-purposing of the brain (Smail 2008). In contrast, the pre-
cautionaries place greater emphasis on the relatively long 
duration of this process, as well as the increasing amount of 
ecological disruption that it has caused in recent times, as 
humanity has become more insistent on expediting the pro-
cess by turning its cerebral emissions (aka ‘ideas’) into real-
ity, regardless of the long-term consequences for the other 
entities on which the brain continues to depend.
But let us step back from politics and think about this 
fork in the road in the future of neuroscience in terms of the 
style of inquiry that each side implies. Thirty-five years ago, 
the philosopher of science Bas van Fraassen (1981) distin-
guished the telescope and the microscope as instruments for 
inquiring into the nature of things. The distinction suggested 
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two modes of epistemic enhancement through technology. 
The telescope magnifies entities that we can already see to 
some extent, the suggestion being that the instrument merely 
fills in the details of our understanding of an object that we 
already know—however indistinctly—with the naked eye, 
such as a planet or a star. It enhances our knowledge with-
out challenging our conceptual framework. In contrast, the 
microscope provides us access to entities, such as germs or 
atoms, to which we not only lacked prior access but also 
might have previously regarded as figments of the imagina-
tion. In this way, microscopic discoveries may cause us to 
rethink our conceptual framework.
This was quite a novel way of distinguishing the two 
instruments. After all, prima facie the difference between 
the telescope and the microscope is that the former makes 
far away big objects visible while the latter makes nearby 
small objects visible. In other words, both instruments are 
ordinarily seen as aiming to present their objects on a com-
mon plane of visibility, which is what normally passes for 
empirical reality. However, in van Fraassen’s reformula-
tion, the two instruments differ substantially in ontological 
import: the microscope as a technology compels a reorien-
tation in world-view that the telescope does not. Current 
foundational debates about the scope of neuroscience pivot 
between van Fraassen’s take on these two instruments. On 
the one hand, our inquiry may be driven by what it is about 
the brain (and nervous system) that enables us to do the sorts 
of things and think the sorts of thoughts that we can already 
do—as well as what inhibits or distorts them. That is a ‘tel-
escopic’ approach, which is associated with our revisionist 
dualist approach to neuroscience. On the other hand, our 
inquiry may be driven by the idea that the brain itself is an 
instrument with privileged access to worlds, which we have 
so far only minimally exploited. That is the ‘microscopic’ 
approach, which is associated with our revisionist materialist 
approach to neuroscience.
Of course, here we are not talking about literal telescopes 
and microscopes, but rather brain-oriented technologies that 
may function either like a telescope or like a microscope 
in terms of van Fraassen’s distinction, depending on the 
epistemic relation we assume to have our brains: does the 
brain’s normal surface functions circumscribe its capacities 
or does the brain possess hidden powers yet to be fathomed? 
Generally speaking, neuroscience approaches the brain with 
three types of instruments: probes (electrodes implanted in 
the cortex), scans (magnetic resonance imaging of brain 
regions) and drugs (targeting neurotransmitters). Brain 
probes may be used either as part of surgery to address a 
diagnosed mental disorder or in a more exploratory vein 
to study subjects’ responses. Similarly, brain scans may be 
targeted to specific areas of the brain associated with a medi-
cal condition or they may provide a comprehensive survey 
of the brain’s blood flow. With regard to drugs, the oldest 
instrument available to regulate brain function, the very 
same drug may be seen as a cure for an existing disorder or 
as enhancing the performance of a normal subject. In each of 
these three cases, the former option represents a telescopic 
approach and the latter a microscopic approach to the brain. 
Requarth (2015) has provocatively characterised these dif-
ferences in the use of neuro-technologies as, respectively, 
‘medicalisation’ (for telescopic) and ‘weaponisation’ (for 
microscopic).
More relevant for our purposes are the radically dif-
ferent conceptions of the brain that underwrite these two 
approaches. In the telescopic case, the brain is seen as 
the governor of the body to which it is attached, with its 
sensory input aimed primarily at managing that body. In 
the microscopic case, the brain is seen as a transducer of 
external stimuli into habitable worlds, very few of which 
we ever realise as embodied beings. Of course, the brain is 
normally seen as both to some extent, but Kant played an 
important role in restricting the latter interpretation of the 
brain, which has had a profound impact on the subsequent 
on the development of neuroscience. Early in his career Kant 
stigmatised his older contemporary Emanuel Swedenborg, a 
theologically minded engineer who first scoped out the pow-
ers of the frontal lobe of the cerebral cortex, as a ‘spirit-seer’ 
for suggesting that our brains might be specially designed 
to know God and the supernatural more generally (Fuller 
2014). Kant’s encounter with Swedenborg’s work turned out 
to be a touchstone for his later more famous work, which 
set limits on the claims of ‘pure reason’, a key moment in 
the institutionalisation of the modern fact-fiction distinction. 
Kant’s rejection of Swedenborg also survives in latter-day 
scepticism about neuroscience’s epistemic prospects, which 
would rate them merely in terms of telescopic inquiry.
Under the telescopic condition, neuroscience’s success is 
judged by the extent to which our knowledge of the brain’s 
workings makes sense of how we normally operate. Thus, 
one looks for regions or patterns that correspond to phenom-
ena that we have associated with, say, ‘speech’ or ‘memory’ 
even before we knew anything about how the brain works. 
The standard of ‘normal’ here is ‘sociological’ in the broad 
sense of publicly observable interpersonal judgements. For 
example, much of what passes for ‘neuromarketing’ research 
scans the brains of people responding to marketing pitches, 
even though the resulting knowledge largely confirms ear-
lier experiments confined to spoken and other behavioural 
responses, which in turn largely matched people’s actual 
purchasing patterns. As for behaviours that do not conform 
to conventional interpersonal judgements—either with posi-
tive or negative consequences—they are presumed to corre-
spond to some deviant brain function. However, if a subject 
has been deemed a ‘genius’, ‘deficient’, or ‘ill’ based on 
independent behavioural criteria, then it becomes the source 
of significant puzzlement if nothing out of the ordinary is 
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discovered about the subject’s brain upon examination. That 
such situations do arise leads those who promote the tel-
escopic view of neuroscience to further downgrade their 
epistemic expectations for the field, since a ‘normal-brained’ 
deviant suggests a preponderance of non-brain factors in 
determining that person’s social–psychological status.
In contrast, under the microscopic condition, the standard 
of neuroscientific success is more ambitious: it is judged by 
the researcher’s ability to identify areas of the brain whose 
stimulation enables activity of sustained novelty that the 
brain might not normally exhibit. The brain may be per-
forming somewhat below a standard of which the organ is 
capable, even if that performance is functional in its envi-
ronment. Unlike the telescopic condition, which basically 
envisages neuroscience as the materialist correlate of folk 
psychology, the microscopic approach envisages the brain 
as an organic technology that is semi-detached from its per-
sonal possessor, but which nevertheless contains the poten-
tial to extend its possessor’s psychic powers indefinitely.
In this respect, the brain is something that we literally 
‘use’, notwithstanding the association of that way of putting 
things with an ‘old look’ dualism. Indeed, the great twenti-
eth century pioneers of neuroscience who directly probed the 
brain—Charles Sherrington and two of his notable students, 
Wilder Penfield and John Eccles—are canonically repre-
sented as mind–body dualists (e.g. Wickens 2015). However, 
they better fit with our ‘new look’ materialism and should be 
understood as making something closer to a proto-cybernetic 
point. When Sherrington originally depicted the brain as a 
very elaborate telephone exchange switchboard, an image 
popularised by his students, it was to suggest that as a brain 
matured—or a mind became autonomous—the switchboard 
operator was gradually internalised as part of the brain’s 
normal operation, thereby enabling the organ to function not 
merely as a governor but as a transducer.
Commitment to a telescopic or a microscopic vision 
of neuroscience may be seen in how one interprets the 
idea of the brain’s ‘innate capacity’. Perhaps the least 
controversial neuroscientific appeal to the expression is 
in discussions of ‘cognitive reserve’ to refer to the mind’s 
resistance to brain damage, reflecting both the holistic and 
regenerative character of the organ. While the amount and 
kind of cognitive reserve varies across individuals, the 
concept itself fits comfortably in the ambit of a telescopic 
approach to neuroscience. In contrast, when William 
James (1914) proposed that the brain had ‘reserve energy’, 
he was referring to the part of the brain that is not used at 
any given time. He made this claim in a popular lecture 
in which he exhorted the audience to make use of this 
reserve in order to live a more productive existence. It is 
clear from the context that he meant that people should put 
themselves in challenging situations where they are forced 
to think differently about the world, a prescription in line 
with the ‘rugged individualism’ popularised by James’ 
former student, Theodore Roosevelt, then President of the 
United States. To be sure, James’ views about the sources 
of the brain’s reserve energy remained quite unresolved at 
the time of his death. At various points, he took seriously 
paranormal phenomena, a hereditary unconscious as well 
as the idea that we normally use only 10% of our brains. 
Seen in retrospect a common thread in his thinking was 
that neuroscience should aim to enable our brains to make 
us more than who we have been—the hallmark of a micro-
scopic approach to the discipline.
It is worth noting that James’ imperative did not exactly 
go unheeded, even though this legacy has been largely 
erased from canonical histories of neuroscience (e.g. Wick-
ens 2015). In particular, what one might call a ‘Jamesian’ 
attitude towards the characteristic neuroscience technolo-
gies flourished in the second half of the twentieth century, 
informed by the idea that the brain’s underutilisation was 
a result of ‘blockages’ that inhibited the free flow of neu-
ral connections. Such thinking could be found in explicitly 
counter-Freudian claims that creativity in both art (Kubie 
1967) and science (Maslow 1966) was not the result of 
sublimation—which involves a repression and channelling 
of base instincts—but of ‘de-sublimation’, so to speak. On 
this view, if one could break deep-seated mental habits (aka 
neuroses) that inhibit variation in performance, then the 
wellsprings of creativity could be unleashed. This move is 
comparable to the turn against ‘representationalism’ in early 
twentieth century art, literature and music, in which aes-
thetic interest was shifted from using a medium to capture a 
preconceived idea to exploring the medium’s full expressive 
capacity—the relevant medium in this case being the brain 
(Fuller 2013).
The move is also reminiscent of what one of the original 
neo-liberal political economists Alexander Rüstow dubbed 
‘liberal interventionism’, whereby the state would not simply 
regulate already existing markets but marketise non-market 
sectors of society by removing the legal protections that had 
allowed the formation of monopolies, which only served to 
stifle the free flow of goods, services—and ideas (Jackson 
2009). Thus, neurological disinhibition—typically involv-
ing psychoactive drugs and/or electrical stimulation—may 
be seen as providing the psychodynamic analogue of what 
Theodore Roosevelt himself had called ‘trust-busting’ 
in the economy. Arguably this link between disinhibition 
and marketisation was unconsciously acknowledged in the 
widespread use of Jeffrey Sachs’ phrase ‘shock therapy’ to 
capture the rapid neo-liberal reform of socialist economies 
in the late 1980s. In any case, in its heyday in the 1950s 
and 1960s, often with financial support and political cover 
from national intelligence agencies, this strand of micro-
scopic neuroscientific inquiry was by today’s standards quite 
adventurous, if not reckless, with subjects who underwent 
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various forms of extreme treatment (Winter 2011: Chap. 4; 
Langlitz 2012: Chap. 1).
In the late 1960s, just before the implementation of a 
more scrupulous ethics regime on the treatment of human—
and some animal—subjects consigned much of this research 
to an ignominious place in the annals of neuroscience, a 
magnum opus was published that presaged a ‘psychocivi-
lized society’, whereby remote control electrical stimulation 
of multiple brains in concert would lay the foundation for 
a harmonious world order (Delgado 1969). Since that time, 
generally speaking, development of brain control technology 
has been limited to the restoration of some normal human 
powers to the disabled and to what is increasingly known as 
‘drone warfare’ (Horgan 2005). However, perhaps reflect-
ing a bit too much success along these lines, there are now 
worries that we may be sleepwalking into a ‘cyborg future’, 
whereby the visible success of these technologies encour-
ages ‘normal’ people to want to replace parts of their body 
with prosthetic extensions or offload functions of their brain 
to computer-based devices, or even self-identify with ava-
tars in cyberspace (Wittes and Chong 2014). In effect, the 
ambitious microscopic vision of neuroscientific inquiry is 
returning through a normative backdoor as people rethink 
‘ability’ in terms of what they would like to be and do rather 
than what is natural for them to be and do.
Before concluding with a more futuristic look at the 
prospects for neuroscience as an organic technology, let us 
consider an analogue to the tele-/micro-scope distinction in 
more conventional silicon-based information technology. To 
be sure, the ontological baseline of the brain and the com-
puter are radically different. However, one characterises the 
‘information’ coded in the brain, it occurs in neural networks 
of varying densities, whereas the information coded in a 
computer occurs in data sets that are accessible by any num-
ber of algorithms. The advent of ‘big data’ has highlighted 
just how much our orientation to the computer as a knowl-
edge producer has been more telescopic than microscopic.
For the past quarter-century the field of ‘knowledge 
management’ has flourished in business schools by promot-
ing the image of data as something that should be ‘mined’ 
(Fuller 2002: Chap. 1). An important implication of this 
image is that some data will be retained as ‘mineral’ but 
most will be discarded as ‘ore’. Algorithms are designed to 
survey big data streams in search of specific patterns that 
the end-user has already identified of relevance. But as these 
algorithms ‘cut through the noise’, the end-user never really 
sees the full range of data available—including those that 
might be of interest. This point has taken on an added sig-
nificance with the advent of personalised health-oriented and 
performance-based ‘self-tracking’ devices. Here one might 
say a kind of ‘telescopic fallacy’ is in full force: it is like 
trying to cure myopia by creating lenses that enable you to 
see more clearly what you can already see indistinctly but 
not what you have never seen at all. Thus, in the name of 
improving accuracy, bias is effectively reinforced.
But there is also a microscopic orientation to big data. 
It involves ‘data surfacing’ rather than ‘data mining’. This 
contrast is a coinage of the leading Silicon Valley cyberse-
curity firm, Palantir (http://www.palan tir.com), which struc-
tures large amounts of data in ways that enable the end-user 
to search for patterns inductively—that is, with a relatively 
loose initial sense of what might be of interest. Whereas 
data-mining reinforces your cognitive biases, data-surfac-
ing aims to extend your cognitive horizons. A characteris-
tic feature of data-surfacing techniques is that they require 
significant human input through the life of the algorithm in 
order for the output to be represented in a way that enables 
the end-users to gain maximum advantage. Thus, Palantir 
prides itself in selling not only data-surfacing platforms 
but also installing its own engineering staff to enable end-
users to discover things about the data at their disposal that 
they perhaps would not never have thought of looking for 
before. While these services are compelling in the concrete 
context of anticipating the next terrorist attack, they under-
score at a conceptual level how human intelligence may be 
enhanced—as opposed to being merely replaced or disci-
plined—by machine intelligence.
3  Conclusion: does the future 
of neuroscience lie in cognitive 
agriculture?
Opposing claims to efficiency have been made on behalf 
of the brain vis-à-vis the computer as (for want of a bet-
ter expression) a ‘knowledge producer’. When the stress is 
placed on processing speed and average accuracy of out-
comes in a specified domain, the computer looks more effi-
cient. But when the stress is placed on energy usage and 
average accuracy of outcomes across many domains, the 
brain looks more efficient. The two sets of criteria are easily 
converted into alternative standards for evaluating ‘intel-
ligence’ in agents more generally (cf. Hernandez-Orallo 
2017). In that respect, conflicting popular judgements about 
the relative intelligence of humans and computers trade on 
differing intuitions of what intelligence is. Moreover, as I 
suggested in the first section, these intuitions themselves 
may represent alternative paradigms for organising energy 
efficiently.
Nevertheless, brains and computers share a key feature 
that offers hope to those interested in computational models 
of the brain: a trade-off between processing speed and energy 
usage in terms of efficiency. Both require more energy to 
process the same information more quickly (Hruska 2014). 
And in terms of baseline energy needs, the brain is likely to 
remain a much more efficient knowledge producer than a 
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computer for the foreseeable future. A sense of the challenge 
facing silicon advocates is that recently a supercomputer 
programmed with a neural network required 40 min to simu-
late 1 s of processing in a brain 2% of the size of a normal 
human brain (Whitwam 2013). This suggests that while it 
may make sense to develop supercomputers capable of sur-
passing human performance in a range of specific tasks, it 
would be an ecological disaster to try to create an artificial 
intelligence capable of approximating the performance of 
the entire human brain. The prospect brings to mind the 
denouement of the 2014 film Transcendence, in which the 
first human to have his brain uploaded into a supercomputer 
manages to short-circuit the entire planet.
One way around this ecological impasse might be to 
upload a vast number of brain emulations into a single super-
computer, resulting in a Star Trek Borg-style hive mind. Of 
course, we have yet to computationally emulate an entire 
human brain, let alone upload it into a supercomputer to 
acquire a second life. But this has not stopped people from 
thinking about how such a development might alter the attri-
bution of rights and responsibilities under the law (Fuller 
2016b), not to mention human evolution more generally 
(Hanson 2016). Nevertheless, given the enormous ecologi-
cal challenge faced by silicon-based computers, might it not 
be more sensible to return to carbon and pursue a strategy 
of what might be called cognitive agriculture? For example, 
one might use stem cells to grow brains or brain-like entities 
from dense clusters of neurons, resulting in multipurpose, 
energy-efficient organic knowledge producers. A harbinger 
may be Philip K. Dick’s 1956 short story, ‘The Minority 
Report’, which was popularised by Steven Spielberg in a 
2002 film starring Tom Cruise. Here we find hydroponically 
cultivated ‘precogs’, mutant offspring of drug addicts, who 
are repurposed to anticipate crimes because of their ability 
to project visions of the future based on processing multiple 
data streams much more efficiently than any silicon-based 
computer. Thus, in the spirit of Putnam’s ‘brains in a vat’ 
thought experiment raised earlier in this article, the Carte-
sian demon is turned to some socially acceptable cognitive 
advantage.
Of course, Dick wrote before embryonic stem cell tech-
nology became available. In the not too distant future it may 
be possible to acquire a significant portion of the brain’s 
computational power without bringing an entire human 
being to fruition. Whether from a legal standpoint the 
resulting entity would constitute a person in its own right 
or merely the possession of its owner is an open question. 
Moreover, we should expect in the meanwhile the same sort 
of ‘morally principled’ objections to the artificial growing 
of brains as we currently see to stem cell research more 
generally and genetically modified organisms. Yet, at the 
same time, exploratory research is underway which have led 
to impressive proofs of concept that DNA may be a more 
efficient way of storing digital information—and not only 
genetic information—than the brain or even silicon chips 
(Rutherford 2013). The major obstacles at the moment per-
tain to the speed of encoding and the ease of accessing the 
encoded information. But were research in this area to be 
incentivised, cultivated strands of the ‘genetic code’ could 
become an important if not the primary means by which 
information in general is stored and retrieved. This ‘smart 
organ’ may be located either in one’s own body or in a dedi-
cated device. But in either case, it would constitute a paral-
lel development that suggests a bright future for cognitive 
agriculture.
I do not underestimate the moral and technical objections 
to a political economy driven by cognitive agriculture. But 
in the end, an ‘ecomodernist’ argument—that is, one based 
on an innovation-driven strategy of energy conservation—is 
likely to prevail in the trajectory’s favour, if we are deter-
mined to promote the fruits of ‘advanced human civilization’ 
into the indefinite future on planet Earth (cf. Fuller 2016c).
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